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Security: icodehq/icode-workbench

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Reporting a vulnerability

Do not disclose vulnerabilities in a public issue. Report them privately through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting, or email oliverxu1996@qq.com if you cannot use GitHub.

Include the iCode Workbench version or commit, operating system and target (local machine or WSL distro), harness, impact, reproduction steps, and any suggested mitigation. Remove credentials, API keys, tokens, and unrelated file paths from logs or examples.

We will acknowledge the report, assess its scope, and coordinate remediation and disclosure timing with you.

Supported versions

iCode Workbench is pre-1.0. Security fixes are provided for the latest release only; older builds are not maintained. Upgrade before reporting a problem that a current build may already have fixed.

Security boundary

iCode Workbench is a local desktop application. It is not a sandbox and does not provide a security boundary between you and the coding agents you choose to run.

  • Model traffic belongs to the harness. Workbench does not call model APIs. Claude Code, Codex, OpenCode, and any other harness you run send repository content and tool output to the endpoint configured for that harness. Treat that endpoint as a disclosure boundary and review the harness's own security model.
  • Agents run with your permissions. Harnesses and shell sessions execute commands as your user. A task, harness, repository, or prompt can change files and run commands. Use worktrees, review changes, and do not run an agent against a repository you would not let an autonomous process modify.
  • Local state. Projects, sessions, worktrees, tasks, and schedules live in local SQLite. Workbench has no telemetry and no hosted service. Session history, terminal scrollback, and worktree contents can contain anything the agent read or produced; protect the profile directory as you would any local source checkout.
  • Renderer isolation. The renderer is sandboxed with context isolation and Node disabled. The preload exposes named operations only, and main validates every IPC payload with Zod and checks the calling frame. Only http(s) links can reach shell.openExternal.
  • WSL. A WSL target runs the Host and harnesses inside the distro. The same permission and disclosure rules apply to processes running there.

Report vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies to their upstream projects; also notify us if iCode Workbench's use of the dependency is affected.

There aren't any published security advisories