Please report a vulnerability privately through GitHub's private reporting rather than in a public issue. I aim to answer within a few days.
DEXPAPRIKA_API_KEYis optional. When set, it is sent in theAuthorizationheader, the key on its own, and only tohttps://mcp.dexpaprika.com. A differentDEXPAPRIKA_MCP_URLwith a key set stops the kit before it connects.LLM_API_KEYgoes only toLLM_BASE_URL, through the officialopenaiclient.TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKENis part of Telegram's API URL by design. pool-radar never prints that URL or the exception text that could contain it.- Keys live in
.env, which is in.gitignore. Nothing is written to disk except the list of pool ids pool-radar has already seen.
Token names and symbols in tool results are set by whoever deployed the token.
- The model in
market_chat.pycan only call the tools listed inTOOLS. A tool result that tells it to do something else cannot reach any other tool, and every DexPaprika tool on that list only reads public market data. - Text from tool results is stripped of control characters and bidirectional overrides before it reaches a model, a terminal or a chat.
- In alerts, token symbols and DEX names also lose markup characters and URL schemes, so a token named like a link cannot post as one. Discord alerts are sent with mentions disabled, Telegram alerts as plain text.
Dependencies are installed from a requirements file pinned with hashes. CI actions are pinned to commit SHAs, Dependabot keeps both current, and the workflow token is read-only.
The signals are paper only. Nothing in this repo places orders or holds funds.