WeftDB is pre-1.0. Only the latest published 0.x release receives fixes.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.2.x | yes |
| < 0.2 | no |
Please do not open a public issue for a security problem.
Report it through GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repository (Security → Report a vulnerability), which opens a channel visible only to the maintainers.
Please include what you have: affected version or commit, a reproducer, and the impact you think it has. You will get an acknowledgement within a week. Since this is a small project, a fix timeline depends on severity, and we will tell you what to expect rather than leave you guessing.
WeftDB is pre-beta. weft-server can serve TLS (WEFT_TLS_CERT_FILE,
WEFT_TLS_KEY_FILE) and authenticate API keys with roles (WEFT_KEYS_FILE, minted by
weft-server keygen), and a non-loopback bind refuses to start without a keys file unless
WEFT_AUTH=disabled says a gateway in front does the authenticating. What it does not have
yet: the security review the roadmap requires before 1.0. (Key reload without a restart
and the fsynced audit log have landed since: WEFT_AUDIT_FILE, default
<store root>/audit.jsonl.) Reports against TLS or authentication are in scope; the missing pieces
above are known gaps tracked on the roadmap.
Bound to a loopback address (the default), weft-server only answers requests
addressed to a loopback host and refuses state-changing requests from non-loopback
web origins, so a web page from another site, open in a browser on the same machine,
cannot drive it. That is a guard for the default deployment, not authentication: any
local process can still call the API, and a page served by another local web server
(any loopback origin, on any port) is still trusted while authentication is off. A local
reverse proxy that forwards a different Host, or a browser UI's
non-loopback Origin, needs WEFT_ALLOW_ANY_HOST=1, which turns the guard off.
What is in scope: memory-safety problems, panics or crashes reachable from untrusted
input (a malformed request body, a corrupt .weftseg segment, a hostile Line Protocol
payload), data corruption or silent precision loss, and anything that lets a caller read
or write data outside the aspect they addressed.