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@dhruv8sh, the same point as on #1487. Directionally, eight identity vendors as files in one shared crate is not compatible with V2 (the 55 pull requests tracked in #777, merged in order), where each vendor is a module in a folder of its own at The V2 spec is identifier-modules, with the folder layout in integrations-crate, both in #1342. The associated pull request is #1382 (a module hands core its identifiers, starting with the Prebid EID cookie). Could you evaluate the V2 spec and #1382 before progressing this pull request? |
ChristianPavilonis
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Summary
Adds eight vendor identity providers and the coordinator hooks they need. Two opt-out handling defects and two UID2 refresh-lifecycle defects need correction before merging.
One inline comment carries a one-click GitHub
suggestion. Use Commit suggestion or Add suggestion to batch to apply it. The other fixes need manual changes across files or outside the diff.
Blocking
🔧 wrench
- UID2 SDK opt-outs leave cached tokens active — see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/uid2.rs:347–349(suggestion). - LiveRamp's 204 opt-out never reaches its parser — see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/liveramp.rs:265–267. - Overdue UID2 refresh credentials are permanently discarded — see the body-level finding below.
- A stale cookie rolls back a refreshed UID2 token — see inline at
crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/coordinator/mod.rs:602–610.
Cross-cutting / body-level findings
🔧 wrench — Overdue UID2 refresh credentials are permanently discarded
References: crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/uid2.rs:173–176 and crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/coordinator/validate.rs:151–155.
Two focused reproductions expose the same underlying problem:
- Importing a still-live identity after
refresh_fromdrops its refresh credentials, so subsequent navigations cannot refresh it. - If a refresh times out while the cookie repeats the stored token, validation drops the cookie's already-due refresh state. The cookie result survives the failed lookup and replaces the stored record without refresh credentials; future attempts stop.
Due refresh state must remain usable rather than becoming invalid merely because its scheduled time passed. The proposed validation change is:
Some(from) if usable => Ok(stored.with_refresh(KvRefresh {
state: refresh.state.into_owned(),
from,
})),Apply manually — the actual guard is outside a diff hunk; its documentation and existing test expectations also need updating. Retain the existing state-size checks and use the configured lookup rate limit to control retries. If the future-only policy is retained for lookup replies, distinguish cookie ingress instead of discarding its already-due credentials.
Verification
- Existing provider unit tests: 91 PASS locally.
- Five focused scratch reproductions confirmed the four findings on the reviewed head. The SDK opt-out regression passes with the suggestion applied in isolation.
- Exact suggestion bytes pass
cargo fmt --all -- --check, all eight clippy aliases,cargo check-fastly,cargo check-axum,cargo check-cloudflare, all four adapter test aliases,cargo test-fastly-reuse, and the cross-adapter parity suite. - The initial local Fastly attempt used Viceroy 0.17 and failed on an unsupported host import; rerunning with the repository-pinned Viceroy 0.21.0 passed.
- Byte-exact post-verification patch comparison: PASS. Scratch changes were discarded; the reviewer worktree is clean at the reviewed head.
Coverage: provider/coordinator implementations were read fully; large supporting files were reviewed through diffs and relevant context rather than exhaustively end-to-end. No live vendor service testing was performed. The prose fix sketches were not applied.
CI Status
- integration tests: PASS
- browser integration tests: PASS
- trace runtime and browser acceptance: PASS
- integration tests (Fastly EC lifecycle): PASS
- cargo test (axum native): PASS
- format-docs: PASS
- CI Node pin guard: PASS
- HTML EOF runtime (Fastly): PASS
- ts dev lint domains (changed lines): PASS
- cargo fmt: PASS
- prepare integration artifacts: PASS
- cargo test (ts CLI, native) (macos-latest): PASS
- cargo test (ts CLI, native) (ubuntu-latest): PASS
- cargo check/build/test (spin native + wasm32-wasip1): PASS
- cargo check (cloudflare native + wasm32-unknown-unknown): PASS
- CLAUDE.md symlink guard: PASS
- worker-deadlines (spin): PASS
- docs-proposal scripts: PASS
- cargo test (cross-adapter parity): PASS
- format-typescript: PASS
- cargo test: PASS
- worker-deadlines (cloudflare): PASS
- vitest: PASS
No required checks were reported for this branch.
aram356
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Summary
This adds eight vendor identity providers and the coordinator hooks they need. Four things block it. The coordinator's cookie path rewrites unchanged IDs while another source is due, which also loses refresh state. Criteo's ID differs from what Prebid sends. LiveRamp's server lookup cannot parse the v2 reply. And ID5's gpp_sid type needs an answer. This round does not repeat the four findings of the earlier review at this head; where a finding here extends one of them, the comment says so.
4 of the inline comments below carry a one-click GitHub
suggestion. Use Commit suggestion, or Add suggestion to batch for several at once. The other comments describe the fix in prose, because it touches several files or lines outside the diff.
Blocking
🔧 wrench
- Cookie IDs that repeat the held UIDs are rewritten while another source is due (a KV write on every navigation, and refresh state lost after a failed refresh): see inline at
crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/coordinator/mod.rs:599-612 - The Criteo bid ID is stored percent-encoded, but Prebid sends it decoded: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/criteo.rs:92-102 - The LiveRamp Custom ID lookup cannot parse a v2 envelope reply (also
atypeandgpp_sid): see inline atcrates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/liveramp.rs:272-273
❓ question
- Does
/gs/v2takegpp_sidas an array?: see inline atcrates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/id5.rs:182-183
Non-blocking
♻️ refactor
- The Lockr capability reads nothing with its defaults: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/common.rs:284-287 - Say which client settings put the token in a cookie (UID2 and ID5; suggestion): see inline at
trusted-server.example.toml:243-247 - Send IPv6 addresses as
ipv6(ID5): see inline atcrates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/id5.rs:360-364 - Match Prebid's ConnectID validity rules: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/connectid.rs:108-118 - Prebid sends the resolved Trade Desk ID as atype 1 (suggestion): see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/liveintent.rs:355-372 - Compare more than the UID strings: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/coordinator/mod.rs:832-854 - Providers now read the clock: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/common.rs:337-339 - Plans and docs that contradict the code: see the body-level finding below
🤔 thinking
- Cookie and consent-derived opt-outs now get the 30-day lockout: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/coordinator/mod.rs:560-565 - A placeholder ID reads as "no ID", not as an opt-out: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/common.rs:153-159 - Structure of this PR: see the body-level finding below
⛏ nitpick
exclude_sourceskeeps the pre-exclusionkeptcount (suggestion): see inline atcrates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/coordinator/mod.rs:770-772- Where GDPR applies, UID2 is skipped for region, not consent (suggestion): see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/uid2.rs:34-35
🌱 seedling
- A generated SharedID changes every 30 days: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/sharedid.rs:131-142 - Smaller gaps: see the body-level finding below
Cross-cutting / body-level findings
♻️ Plans and docs that contradict the code
The plans say "Status: Implemented", but several statements no longer match the code:
2026-11-02-identity-provider-uid2.md, "Stored ID": the token "is refreshed only when the cookies no longer yield a usable token". Since25f35720b, it is also refreshed while the cookie repeats it.2026-11-02-identity-provider-uid2.md, risk note: "a server refresh spends the SDK cookie's refresh token ... the browser SDK's own refresh of that identity may then fail". A refresh token is not spent. The operator'sUIDOperatorService.refreshIdentityhas no replay check, and the UID2 token docs say "Refreshing a UID2 token does not invalidate/expire the original or previous UID2 token". The server refresh and the SDK refresh both succeed and fork into two token chains. Combined with the stale-cookie rollback from the earlier review, that can repeat the refresh about every other navigation until the cookie'sidentity_expires, bounded only byrate_limit_per_hour(inferred).2026-11-02-identity-provider-liveramp.md: the goal and architecture still say "no server call" and "build_requestalways fails", and "Stored ID" documents200 {"envelope"}(see the LiveRamp comment).2026-11-02-identity-provider-id5.md: an opted-outuniversal_uidof0"is reported asLookupOutcome::NoMatch". The code reportsOptedOut.2026-11-02-identity-provider-connectid.md: "The provider reads no clock".is_expiredreads it.2026-11-02-identity-provider-liveintent.md: "TheExpiresheader becomesProviderExpiry::At". The code producesAfter(Expires - Date).2026-11-02-identity-provider-criteo.md,criteo.rs:4-6and the example config: "still percent-encoded" (see the Criteo comment).docs/guide/configuration.md:836:allowed_domainsis marked required, but cookie-only kinds without anendpointdo not need it, and the field has#[serde(default)].
🤔 Structure of this PR
jwrosewell's question on this PR about the V2 layout (one module per vendor under identity/<vendor>, each with its own maintainer; #1342 and #1382) is still unanswered. Independent of that answer, this PR combines framework changes with eight vendors in 7.2k lines. The description offers to move the framework hooks into #1487. Doing that, and landing the vendors as separate PRs, would let each vendor's fidelity be reviewed and verified against its own service on its own.
🌱 Smaller gaps
validate.rs:171clamps absolute expiries to 30 days but leavesProviderExpiry::Afterunbounded in core. Every provider here bounds it itself, so this is defense in depth.- The adapter's joining of multiple
Cookieheaders intoRequestCookies(crates/trusted-server-adapter-fastly/src/app.rs:433-439) has no test, and the adapter tests passRequestCookies::default(). id5.rsdefines the same"0"twice, asOPTED_OUT_UID(line 71) andOPT_OUT_UID(line 415).
Verification
- Every changed file was read at
25f35720b. Vendor behaviour was checked against Prebid.jsmastermodules, LiveRamp's ATS Envelope API docs, ID5's Prebid Server Java module,uid2-web-integrationsanduid2-operator. No live vendor calls were made. - The coordinator findings were reproduced with probe tests that run
dispatch,collectandplan_write. The fix proposed atmod.rs:599-612makes both blocking probes pass, and all existingec::tests and the 91 provider tests still pass (native run). The Criteo and ID5ipv6prose fixes were compiled and tested in a scratch tree; the other prose sketches were not applied. - Each suggestion was applied on its own at this head, and its patch was byte-identical before and after the checks:
liveintent.rs(TDID atype):cargo fmt --check,clippy-fastly,check-fastly,check-axum,check-cloudflare,test-fastly.coordinator/mod.rs(keptcount):cargo fmt --check,clippy-fastly,clippy-axum,clippy-cloudflare,clippy-cloudflare-wasm,clippy-spin-native,clippy-spin-wasm,clippy-cli, the threecheck-*aliases,test-fastly,test-fastly-reuse,test-axum,test-cloudflare,test-spin, and the parity suite.uid2.rs(module doc):cargo fmt --check,clippy-fastly.trusted-server.example.toml: every added line is a comment.- All four together:
cargo fmt --check,clippy-fastly, native core and provider tests.
CI Status
- CI Node pin guard: PASS
- CLAUDE.md symlink guard: PASS
- HTML EOF runtime (Fastly): PASS
- browser integration tests: PASS
- cargo check (cloudflare native + wasm32-unknown-unknown): PASS
- cargo check/build/test (spin native + wasm32-wasip1): PASS
- cargo fmt: PASS
- cargo test: PASS
- cargo test (axum native): PASS
- cargo test (cross-adapter parity): PASS
- cargo test (ts CLI, native) (macos-latest): PASS
- cargo test (ts CLI, native) (ubuntu-latest): PASS
- docs-proposal scripts: PASS
- format-docs: PASS
- format-typescript: PASS
- integration tests: PASS
- integration tests (Fastly EC lifecycle): PASS
- prepare integration artifacts: PASS
- trace runtime and browser acceptance: PASS
- ts dev lint domains (changed lines): PASS
- vitest: PASS
- worker-deadlines (cloudflare): PASS
- worker-deadlines (spin): PASS
No required checks are configured for this base branch.
| reader.lockr = names | ||
| .into_iter() | ||
| .filter(|name| !reader.own.contains(name)) | ||
| .collect(); |
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♻️ refactor: The Lockr capability reads nothing with its defaults
with_lockr drops Lockr names that are already in own, and every Lockr default equals that kind's own default: id5id for ID5, _lr_env for LiveRamp (own default ["_lr_env", "idl_env"]) and __uid2_advertising_token for UID2. So [settings.lockr] enabled = true with the defaults reads no extra cookie. Neither do the three Lockr tables in trusted-server.example.toml, which repeat the own names. An operator who turns Lockr on sees no change.
With custom names, [settings.lockr].cookie_names behaves exactly like appending those names to cookie_names: same parser, same order, read before any lookup. The only difference is a debug log line. That is a trait, a settings type, reads_lockr, gating tests, a plan and docs, with no behaviour beyond cookie_names.
Suggest removing the capability and documenting "add the Lockr key to cookie_names" until there is Lockr-specific behaviour, for example provenance through inserter, or the revoke-consent opt-out the Lockr plan lists as not ported. If it stays, the example tables should use a key that differs from the own cookies, and the docs should say the default Lockr keys are already read as own cookies.
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The capability stays, and f68083c changes it:
- The example tables now use Lockr keys that differ from the vendors' own cookies. The docs say the default Lockr keys are already read as own cookies, so enabling the capability with the defaults reads nothing extra.
- Lockr-specific behaviour: Lockr cookies are not read where GDPR applies. Prebid's
lockrAIMIdSystemstops whengdprAppliesis true, so a Lockr cookie on such a request is a leftover, not a current delivery. Own cookies are still read there.
inserter provenance and revoke-consent are not ported. Lockr's storage holds neither: per the Prebid module, it stores the raw advertising_token under the configured key_name, and its own keys are localStorage only. Both exist only in Lockr API responses, which the framework does not capture. The plan records this.
prk-Jr
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Summary
This round covers areas the two earlier reviews at this head did not reach: the auction read path, untrusted response handling in the providers, and the CLI's provider validation. It found two new blocking problems. UID2 IDs that the GDPR exclusion removes can still reach bidders. A large LiveIntent segments list drops LiveIntent's own ID. The earlier findings are not repeated here.
Blocking
🔧 wrench
- UIDs the GDPR exclusion removes are still sent to bidders: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/coordinator/mod.rs:361 - A large LiveIntent
segmentslist dropsnonId: see inline atcrates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/liveintent.rs:337-346
Non-blocking
🤔 thinking
- ID5 never sends back the previous
signature: see inline atcrates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/id5.rs:21
⛏ nitpick
- ID5 percent-decodes the fetch reply before the opt-out check: see inline at
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/id5.rs:390 RequestCookiesDebugprints the whole Cookie header: see inline atcrates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/provider.rs:168
Verification
- The findings were reproduced with probe tests in a scratch tree at
25f35720b: an auction-read probe for the GDPR finding, plus probes for the LiveIntent ext size and the ID5 reply decoding. The ID5 signature point is not checked against ID5's docs or a live call. cargo test -p trusted-server-core --lib ec::(native): 523 passed.- Checked and found sound:
CheckedAppConfig(no provider readssecretsat build, so validating before secrets resolve is safe); checking the rate limit only once a request is built; cookie and lookup merging; an unknown jurisdiction failing closed;endpoint: None(every request is still checked againstallowed_domains); UID2 refresh decryption and its panic paths; response size caps; and identifiers going only to the configured endpoint. - No live vendor calls were made. The fixes are prose sketches and were not applied.
CI Status
All 23 checks PASS at 25f35720b, including cargo test, cargo fmt, cross-adapter parity, axum/cloudflare/spin, ts CLI (macOS and Ubuntu), integration and browser integration tests, Fastly EC lifecycle, vitest and the format jobs. No required checks are configured for this base branch.
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Re: review 5814450927 (ChristianPavilonis) Fixed in 5c0bca7. Validation now keeps refresh state whose Re: review 5821978901 (aram356) Plans and docs: fixed in 7b60dd6, with the UID2 risk note rewritten in 8f575ad. Token chains: a server refresh and an SDK refresh do fork, as you describe. Since 7667acf an older cookie no longer rolls the refreshed token back, and since 5c0bca7 a failed refresh keeps the state. Once the SDK refreshes, its newer cookie token replaces the stored one, so the row follows the SDK chain again instead of alternating on every navigation. What remains is one server refresh per Structure: No. We are keeping this as a stack instead: #1487 holds the framework and this PR the vendors. The coordinator hooks that only the vendors use (cookie reads, refresh freshness, Lockr) stay here, next to the code that needs them. Smaller gaps:
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Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Add an optional IdentityProvider::read_request_cookies step that runs for providers with due sources before any lookup. Cookie IDs pass the same consent gates, validation and write plan as lookup results and replace the lookup. The provider endpoint becomes optional so cookie-only kinds need none; lookup kinds reject a missing endpoint. Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
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CREATOR: From the server-side identity plan (#1559, |
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
…s not run them Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
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Two findings from @ChristianPavilonis's review (#1488 (review)) are filed as follow-ups, since each changes persisted opt-out state or the request egress paths:
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ID5 rejects a fetch without v with 400 missing (v)ersion on both /g/v2 and /gs/v2, so no server-side ID5 lookup succeeded. Send the crate version as v; o, tml and nbPage stay unsent. Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me> # Conflicts: # crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/provider.rs
ID5, LiveIntent, ConnectID, UID2, Criteo, UnifiedID and SharedID send no EC ID, so they now report sends_ec_id false and are looked up within identity_budget_ms on the first navigation, with results in the write that creates the row. LiveRamp puts the EC ID in its envelope lookup and keeps waiting for a later navigation. Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Add a provider-kinds table and per-kind sections covering server calls, first-page-view behaviour (every kind but LiveRamp runs on the navigation that mints the EC), default cookies, Lockr, atype, TTLs, opt-out and GDPR handling, and the ID5 fetch body including v. Drop the stale claim that this release registers no provider kind. Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
LiveRamp sends the EC ID only in its Custom ID envelope lookup. Without an endpoint it only reads cookies, so sends_ec_id now reports whether a lookup is configured, and a cookie-only LiveRamp joins the first page view like the other kinds. Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
Read the cookie named by the Prebid sharedId module's storage.name, default the source to pubcid.org with atype 1, and keep a stored SharedID for as long as the row lives instead of letting a different cookie replace it after a day. Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
#1488 already dropped core's blanket rejection of enabled providers. Note in core's deploy validation that ts config checks registered kinds by building each provider, and test that core accepts an enabled provider. Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
A stored SharedID no longer wins over a different cookie value. When Prebid writes its own SharedID after Trusted Server generated one, bidders get the ID Prebid sends from the browser. Cookie IDs again expire after a day and generated IDs after MAX_TTL; the cookie name, source and atype defaults stay. Signed-off-by: dhruv8sh <dhruv8sh@proton.me>
ChristianPavilonis
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Summary
Adds eight vendor identity providers and the cookie, refresh, consent and configuration hooks they need. Previously corrected feedback is not repeated; three existing opt-out privacy defects remain unresolved at 518f88984900d97262594f64ec60a600085a5d64, so changes are still required.
One inline comment carries a one-click GitHub suggestion. The other four findings are body-level and describe manual changes; the three blocking findings reference their existing reports rather than creating duplicate inline threads.
Blocking
🔧 wrench
- An unchanged cookie reverses a server-reported opt-out — existing #1602; see body-level finding 1.
- Vendor opt-out cookies do not suppress current-request identity egress — existing #1603; see body-level finding 2.
- A delayed lookup can restore a source after a newer cookie opt-out — existing #1604; see body-level finding 3.
Non-blocking
♻️ refactor
- Correct SharedID lifetime and precedence documentation — see inline at
trusted-server.example.toml:302–303(suggestion). - Configuration documentation describes obsolete behavior — see body-level finding 5.
Cross-cutting / body-level findings
1. 🔧 An unchanged cookie reverses a server-reported opt-out — #1602
Reference: crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/coordinator/mod.rs:598–604.
Any usable cookie clears the provider's remembered opt-out. A server refresh does not rewrite the browser cookie, so that cookie is not evidence of renewed consent or identity issuance.
A fresh two-navigation reproduction with the real ID5 provider confirmed this at the reviewed head: the first navigation receives universal_uid: "0", clears the source and remembers the server opt-out; the next navigation sends the same id5id=held-id cookie, forgets that opt-out and restores held-id.
Keep server-reported suppression until there is evidence of a renewed identity. For example:
remember opt-out with the observed cookie fingerprint
clear suppression only when a genuinely renewed identity arrives
Apply manually — requires persisted-state and lifecycle-test changes. This remains the existing unresolved #1602, not a new duplicate finding.
2. 🔧 Vendor opt-out cookies do not suppress current-request identity egress — #1603
References: crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/coordinator/mod.rs:583–590, crates/trusted-server-adapter-fastly/src/app.rs:1065–1111, crates/trusted-server-core/src/auction/endpoints.rs:354–391, and crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/identify.rs:104–118.
The cookie reader records an opt-out for the later write. The publisher auction still uses the earlier snapshot, while named auction/page-bids/identify routes never run those provider cookie readers. The ordinary GDPR/vendor filters do not replace request-local vendor opt-out suppression.
A fresh authenticated identify reproduction with a stored ID5 UID and id5id=0 returned the stored held-id. The publisher, page-bids and auction consumers were also traced through their shared EID resolver/filter paths.
read vendor opt-out cookies before identity egress
remove denied sources from stored and browser-supplied EIDs
Apply manually — must cover publisher auctions, page-bids, /auction and identify without adding provider HTTP lookups to read-only routes. This remains the existing #1603.
3. 🔧 A delayed lookup can restore a source after a newer cookie opt-out — #1604
References: crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/write_plan.rs:130–163 and crates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/after_response.rs:90–103.
Cookie opt-outs leave no persisted revocation marker. The after-response writer re-reads the newer row and uses its current generation, so CAS protects only changes after that last read, not the revocation that happened while the lookup was in flight.
A fresh reproduction dispatched an ID5 lookup, committed a newer cookie opt-out, confirmed the source was absent, then collected the older response and passed it through commit_after_response_lookups. The source was restored as late-result. A control confirmed that whole-row consent withdrawal does correctly block the same delayed result.
capture provider revision at dispatch
discard results superseded by a newer revocation
Apply manually — requires dispatch/persistence changes and an ordering regression. This remains the existing #1604; filing the follow-up has not corrected the behavior.
5. ♻️ Configuration documentation describes obsolete behavior — non-blocking
References:
docs/guide/configuration.md:935–937says push/diff do not know the target adapter.docs/guide/configuration.md:1037–1039,crates/trusted-server-cli/src/checked_app_config.rs:4–7, andcrates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/lib.rs:184–191describe invalid providers being disabled per request.
The implementation instead selects ProviderlessAppConfig from the push/diff adapter and propagates provider-build errors out of Fastly application startup. Suggested authoritative wording:
`ts config validate` is adapter-agnostic. `ts config push` and
`ts config diff` reject enabled providers for targets other than Fastly.
On Fastly, invalid enabled provider configuration prevents application
startup; providers are not silently disabled for individual requests.Apply manually — the correction spans multiple files and separate documentation blocks.
Verification and scope
Reviewed only this PR's delta against feat/s2s-eid-collection-core: merge base bc8df76ccaf243877c4754c2df9e9ee8ef100385, head 518f88984900d97262594f64ec60a600085a5d64.
cargo test-fastly, using repository-pinned Viceroy 0.21.0: 4,040 tests/doc-tests passed, 31 ignored, zero failures.cargo test -p trusted-server-identity-providers --lib --locked: 114 passed.cargo test -p trusted-server-core --lib ec:: --locked: 591 passed.cargo test -p trusted-server-core --lib auction::endpoints::tests --locked: 36 passed.- Isolated review probes: 13 passed, including the three defect reproductions; whole-row withdrawal protection; full CLI-wrapper validation success, unknown-kind rejection and disabled-provider bypass; SharedID default-source roundtrip; and private refresh-state omission from identify output.
cargo fmt --all -- --checkand pinned-rangegit diff --check: PASS.- The exact comment-only inline suggestion was verified independently: valid TOML, identical complete parsed configuration, whitespace check and byte-exact post-verification patch comparison.
- Probe sources and suggestion edits were discarded. The reviewer worktree is clean at the reviewed head; no commits or pushes were made.
Provider implementations/tests and the affected startup, cookie, persistence/concurrency, egress and configuration paths were reviewed. Unchanged unrelated sections of the largest supporting files were not exhaustively audited. No live vendor API calls were made; UID2 service refresh and LiveRamp Custom ID service validation remain unverified. The cross-adapter matrix relies on passing remote CI rather than a duplicate full local run. Local compilation initially required resuming timed-out builds and correcting probe-only toolchain/fixture setup; final results above passed.
CI Status
- integration tests: PASS
- trace runtime and browser acceptance: PASS
- browser integration tests: PASS
- integration tests (Fastly EC lifecycle): PASS
- ts dev lint domains (changed lines): PASS
- HTML EOF runtime (Fastly): PASS
- Analyze (actions): PASS
- cargo test: PASS (required)
- cargo test (axum native): PASS
- Analyze (rust): PASS
- vitest: PASS
- cargo check/build/test (spin native + wasm32-wasip1): PASS
- cargo test (cross-adapter parity): PASS
- format-typescript: PASS (required)
- format-docs: PASS (required)
- CLAUDE.md symlink guard: PASS
- cargo test (ts CLI, native) (ubuntu-latest): PASS
- cargo check (cloudflare native + wasm32-unknown-unknown): PASS
- cargo fmt: PASS (required)
- CI Node pin guard: PASS
- worker-deadlines (cloudflare): PASS
- docs-proposal scripts: PASS
- prepare integration artifacts: PASS
- CodeQL: PASS
- Analyze (javascript-typescript): PASS
- release scripts: PASS
- Analyze (python): PASS
- Analyze (javascript-typescript): PASS
- cargo test (ts CLI, native) (macos-latest): PASS
- worker-deadlines (spin): PASS
| # ["pubcid.org"], which needs a matching [[ec.partners]] entry. A stored | ||
| # SharedID lives as long as the row and wins over a different cookie value. |
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♻️ Correct SharedID lifetime and precedence documentation — non-blocking
The current implementation gives cookie IDs a 24-hour expiry and generated IDs a 30-day expiry; a different usable cookie ID replaces the stored ID. This example still describes the superseded store-wins behavior.
| # ["pubcid.org"], which needs a matching [[ec.partners]] entry. A stored | |
| # SharedID lives as long as the row and wins over a different cookie value. | |
| # ["pubcid.org"], which needs a matching [[ec.partners]] entry. Cookie IDs | |
| # are kept for 24 hours; generated IDs for 30 days. A different cookie ID | |
| # replaces the stored ID. |
Verification: applied these exact bytes in isolation; both versions parse as TOML and their complete parsed configurations are identical. git diff --check and the byte-exact post-verification drift check passed.
Stacked on #1487.
Summary
extPer vendor
/gs/v2fetch API with an RFC 3339tsandgpp_sidas an array; carrieslinkTypeand keepsext; auniversal_uidof0is an opt-outdid-distributor ID;segmentsonly when non-empty_lr_env, or the bare envelope Prebid stores inidl_env); with anendpoint,placement_idandcustom_id_namespace, a visitor without a cookie is looked up server side by Custom IDconnectIdfirst-party cookie; no server callendpoint, the token is refreshed server side before it expires_sharedid/_pubcidcookie as an atype 1 EID; honours_pubcid_optout; withgenerate = true(default off), generates a UUID stored only in the rowcto_bididcookie, stored verbatim as the atype 1 EID Prebid sendsTDIDfrom thepbjs-unifiedidcookie, withrtiPartnerext andadserver.orginserter/matcher, mm 4Consent and cookie handling
Known limitations
connectIdcookie is still read until it expires, and SharedID generation should be enabled only where the opt-out lives in the_pubcid_optoutcookie.The plans list the remaining unported reference behaviours.
Changes
crates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/{id5,liveintent,liveramp,connectid,uid2,sharedid,criteo,unifiedid}.rscrates/trusted-server-identity-providers/src/common.rscrates/trusted-server-core/src/ec/provider.rs,ec/coordinator/crates/trusted-server-core/src/settings.rs,adapter-fastly/src/app.rstrusted-server.example.tomldocs/guide/configuration.md,docs/guide/api-reference.mddocs/superpowers/plans/2026-11-02-identity-provider-*.mdCloses
Part of #1246 and #1245. No issue is closed yet.
Spec
The spec is in #1487. This PR adds only plans, no new spec.
Test plan
cargo test-fastly && cargo test-fastly-reuse && cargo test-axum && cargo test-cloudflare && cargo test-spincargo fmt --all -- --checktemplate_build_digesttest and its clippy runscripts/lint-wasm-clock.sh./scripts/test-cli.sh, the node pin guard, docs-proposal scripts, andts dev lint domainsagainst the base branch/gs/v2fetch returned an ID that was stored in KV and attached to the auctionChecklist
unwrap()in production codelogmacrosCloses #1567