@perfscale/library-python is a trusted-code component: its whole
purpose is downloading CPython and executing it on the host via the
perfscale process capability (RFC 009). Treat any report of "this library
can run python scripts" as working as intended.
Genuinely security-relevant findings are cases where the component exceeds its contract, for example:
- Downloading from anything other than
https://github.com/astral-sh/python-build-standaloneover HTTPS, or skipping the SHA-256 verification against the release'sSHA256SUMSbefore extraction. - Spawning anything other than the documented
/usr/bin/uname,/usr/bin/test(cache probe),/usr/bin/mkdir,/usr/bin/curl,/usr/bin/sha256sum,/usr/bin/tar,/usr/bin/rm(the downloaded archive only), or the selected python binary. - Leaking host environment variables into a child (the host import already guarantees a replacement environment; a bug that bypasses it matters).
- The cache-idempotency or bad-archive cleanup deleting anything other than
the downloaded
.tar.gzarchive. - Validation gaps that let crafted
with:params or settings blocks (extension / variables / librarywith:) alter the spawned argv or environment in undocumented ways.
- "The step ran the script the YAML told it to run." Capability grants
(
capabilities: [process],allow_process_actions: true,allow_library_capabilities: true) are the operator's explicit, double opt-in decision. - Denial of service via long-running or noisy scripts — timeouts are
host-capped; tune
timeout_ms.
Do not open a public issue for a vulnerability. Report privately to the Perfscale maintainers (see the contact in the main perfscale repository's SECURITY.md) with a minimal YAML + script reproducer. We aim to acknowledge within 7 days.
Only the latest release receives security fixes.